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Introduction 
 
The Arctic Ocean remains one of the last frontier regions on earth to be explored and 
exploited. However, due to global warming, technological advances and declining stocks 
of global resources, increasing interest and activity in the Arctic is underway. 
 
This renewed interest in the Arctic has sparked a new vigor by Canada and the United 
States in promoting their State interests in the region. In particular the fabled Northwest 
Passage runs through Canadian territory known as the Arctic Archipelago which is 
adjacent to the northern mainland Canadian coastline. It also happens to be the most 
direct, albeit seldom navigable route for the United States to Alaska from its eastern 
population bases. 
 
Canada has historically claimed the constituent lands and waters of the NWP as its 
sovereign territory, whereas the United States has consistently referred to the NWP as an 
international strait with which they claim an unfettered right of passage of the freedom of 
the seas. 
 
Canada in contrast has reactively grasped for every sovereign justification it can, to armor 
its defense of arctic sovereignty with.  Canada has cited its historic association through 
cession of its lands from the Indigenous people and the British Crown sovereign. Canada 
has also sighted the sector theory laying claim to all the waters and lands within its sector 
to the north pole, and has most strongly relied on the setting of straight baselines around 
its arctic archipelago and asserting that all constituent waters within the baselines are 
Canadian internal waters. 
 
To ameliorate the American demands for an undeterred right of passage, Canada in 
response to American aggression has enacted environmental protectionist legislation for 
the arctic environment and entered into the 1988 Arctic Agreement with the U.S. who 
promised to notify Canada of any planned excursions by sea into the waters of the NWP 
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and in  return Canada has promised to grant blessings to all such endeavors as they are 
announced. 
 
The problem is one of ‘command and control’. Namely who should control the NWP and 
access to the Arctic Ocean? The United States sees the Canadian position as encroaching 
on it’s freedom of transit (right of innocent passage1) and as violating the law of the sea 
as set out in the Corfu Channel Case2. Canada in contrast, believes on the basis of equity 
and the uniqueness of its archipelago that the waters of the NWP are internal to Canada, 
and that furthermore there is insufficient shipping traffic history to satisfy the 
‘functionality’ test as set out in the Corfu Channel case. In response to the excursion of 
the Polar Sea3 through the NWP without prior Canadian approval, the Canadian 
government set out a course to embed its sovereignty in the region and looked to the 
Norwegian Fisheries case and the supporting archipelago principles for establishing 
extended straight baselines to include these island formations where the ecology is 
sensitive and vital needs are established. Furthermore, Canada has also influenced the 
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (Montego Bay) 1982, Article 17. 
2 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J. 4. 
3 The Polar Sea is a US Coast Guard Heavy ice-breaker, which circumnavigated  the Northwest Passage in 
the summer of 1985.  Whatever the motive - a challenge to Canada's claim to the Passage or, as U. S. 
authorities maintained, a quick and inexpensive way to get the Polar Sea from Greenland to Alaska-the 
U.S. government was careful not to make a request for permission to make the crossing and thereby imply 
in any way recognition of Canada's claim to the strait. Instead, the United States made clear that the voyage 
was without prejudice to the legal position of the other side. (Excerpted from Independence and 
Internationalism, chapter 10, "A Northern Dimension for Canada's Foreign Policy", pp. 127-135, in 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC), Volume 14, No.6, “The Question of Sovereignty” at 
http://www.carc.org/pubs/v14no4/6.htm). Ottawa to save face, once again, made a point of granting 
permission; it even asked to place several "observers" on board the Polar Sea and Washington acceded to 
the request, strengthening Canada's argument that the transit was consensual and even promised to provide 
advance notice of any future transits by its Coastguard vessels. Yet the U.S. still made a point of publicly 
disputing the sovereignty claim. Following the voyage of the Polar Sea, Canada again modified its legal 
position. (Excerpted from The Tyee, “The Need to Defend Our Northwest Passage”, Micheal Byers, 
January 30, 2006) “The voyage of the Polar Sea caused a rush of popular anxiety in Canada. Pressure built 
quickly, and on September 10, 1985, the government responded in a statement in the House of Commons 
by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Clark announced a number of measures intended to 
strengthen Canada's claim, including notification that Canada was drawing straight baselines around the 
arctic archipelago to delineate its claim, the removal of the 1970 reservation to the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice,* increased aerial surveillance, naval activities in Canada's eastern arctic 
waters, and construction of a class 8 polar icebreaker. Taken together these measures have the potential 
significantly to strengthen Canada's claim to sovereignty over the waters of the arctic archipelago.” 
(Excerpted from Independence and Internationalism, chapter 10, "A Northern Dimension for Canada's 
Foreign Policy", pp. 127-135.) 
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UNCLOS4 which adopted Article 234 to allow for special state powers for ice-covered 
regions in order to protect the environment, health and safety of these adverse regions.  
 
Statement of Claim 
This paper is an exploration of the substantive merit of Canada’s position on the 
Northwest Passage (NWP), that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago through which the 
NWP passes are its internal waters. In particular, is Canada justified in its claim and what 
legal premises support its position? And, furthermore in view of the conflicting claim of 
the United States of its right of innocent passage through an international strait what 
probable means of middle ground may be employed to amicably resolve this dispute 
between two of the worlds most neighborly nations.  
 
History of the NWP 
The Northwest Passage (NWP) is an ice laded sea route linking the North Atlantic and 
North Pacific Oceans via the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The archipelago also known 
as the Arctic Archipelago is a group of 36,563 islands and contains 94 islands greater 
than 130 square kilometers, including three of the worlds largest islands. With the 
exception of Greenland, the archipelago is the worlds largest high arctic land area and 
extends some 2400 kilometers longitudinally and 1900 kilometers from the mainland of 
Canada to its northern most point on Ellesmere Island. It is bounded on the south by the 
Hudson Bay and the Canadian mainland; on the east by Greenland, Baffin Bay and Davis 
Strait; on the north by the Arctic Ocean and on the west by the Beaufort Sea. The various 
islands of the archipelago are separated from each other and the continental mainland by 
a shallow myriad maze of narrow ice-blocked straits that are typically frozen throughout 
the year which at their northern ends open into the frozen Arctic Sea.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 1982, Article 234 ice-covered areas. 
5 Encyclopedia Wikipedia, http://en.wikedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage 
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Exhibit 1 
Source: Wikimedia 
 
The NWP was alternatively known as the Strait of Anian6, which was a 16th century 
Spanish name for a passage that was believed to connect the Pacific Ocean and the 
Atlantic Ocean in the temperate regions of North America, as a much desired means of 
circumpolar shipping for commerce. Such a strait does not in fact exist but for centuries 
European explorers searched for such a route and at the same time explorers were also 
attempting to find an eastern bound passage north of Russia i.e. a Northeast Passage 
(NEP).7 
 
In recent years amidst global warming and rapid melting in the Arctic (Refer to Exhibit 
2), many reports have taken to declaring the fabled NWP will soon be a viable option for 
circumpolar shipping, which will shave five thousand miles off circumpolar sea voyages 
                                                 
6 American University, Canadian Sovereignty at the Northwest Passage, ICE Case Studies Number 185, 
May 2006. http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/northwest-passage.htm 
7 Encyclopedia Wikipedia, http://en.wikedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage 
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that otherwise would have to go through the Panama Canal to circumnavigate the 
Americas. However, these predictions need to be met with cautious optimism according 
to John Falkingham, Chief of Ice Forecasting for the Canadian Ice Service. “Currently 
the Canadian Arctic’s shipping season, such as it is, lasts only about four to six weeks, 
and that’s not going to change anytime soon. We don’t expect the NWP to be free of ice 
for an extended period of the summer until much later in the century.” 8 Peter Tyson in a 
report on the future of the NWP suggests that the summer shipping season will remain 
treacherous for even the most well equipped icebreaking vessels and that the alternative 
Russian NEP also commonly known as the Northern Sea Route is currently utilized and 
recognized as “a more straightforward path than the labyrinthine Canadian archipelago 
allows; rather than Canada’s thicket of islands, Russia’s route has just several straits for 
ships to pass through. And its summertime ice conditions are often better. The Northern 
Sea Route is already open up to eight weeks a year, with at least a million and half tons of 
shipping going through.”9 
 
   Exhibit 2 
 
 
Source: U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration 
 
                                                 
8 Tyson, Peter, Future of the Passage, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/arctic/passage.html 
9 Ibid. 
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Similarly it is also increasingly suggested that a shipping route straight across the top of 
the northern hemisphere, via a direct route through the thinning ice of the North Pole10 
which is now at times ice free during summer months, is believed by experts to be more 
likely to happen in this century than a route through the NWP (with its congestion of age 
old ice-choked islands).11 As Bob Gorman (Enfotec) argues “since the oldest and thickest 
ice in the Arctic Ocean is that which is driven against the western flank of the Canadian 
Archipelago this will likely be the last multi-year ice to remain”12 in the Arctic.   
 
Exhibit 3 
Future of the Passage 
 
Despite the reported widespread thinning of Arctic ice, even the Swedish icebreaker Oden had trouble 
negotiating the Northwest Passage when it muscled through in mid-July 2005.  
Source: PBS - NOVA Science Programming On Air and Online. 
 
                                                 
10 The term North Pole refers to the northern most point on Earth. 
11 Old ice from the Arctic Ocean drifts into the Queen Elizabeth Islands (QEI) (i.e. NWP – Canadian 
Archipelago) from the west, “blocking the narrow passages between islands. Ice concentrations in the QEI 
are extremely high resulting in limited and incomplete navigation and scientific study.” In: Wilson, K.J., 
Falkingham, J., Melling, H. and De Abreu, R., Shipping in the Canadian Arctic: Other Possible Climate 
Change Scenarios, Canadian Ice Service Meteorological Service of Canada and Fisheries and Oceans, 
Institute of Ocean Services. 
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With the summer seasonal melt and clearing of ice at the North Pole, it is now being 
asserted that the Arctic Polar Route (APR) straight over the North Pole, alternatively 
represents a more navigable and ice manageable Arctic shipping route, which would 
shorten circumpolar shipping by 8000 miles versus 5000 miles saved by NWP and 
NEP.13 
 
Exhibit 4 
 
 
Presumably, if both the NEP and APR currently and in the future represent more viable 
routes for circumpolar navigation then why do the marine industry and the governments 
of the United States and Canada seem so interested in the NWP? Essentially, as Bob 
Gorman notes “the marine industry is focused on the Arctic as a destination and not a 
short-cut between the Atlantic and the Pacific either now or in the next 10 to 20 years. Oil 
and gas activity is restricted to the on-shore MacKenzie Delta at the moment with plans 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Gorman Bob, in Arctic Marine TransportWorkshop, 28-30 September 2004, Institute of the North, U.S. 
Arctic Research Commission, International Arctic Science Committee. 
13 Tyson, Peter, Future of the Passage, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/arctic/passage.html 
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by the Aboriginal Pipeline Group to build a gas pipeline to the delta during the next 10 
years. Once the pipeline is in place offshore oil and gas activity in the Beaufort Sea14 will 
likely pick-up once again.”15 
 
While the NWP dispute between the United States and Canada is a global issue in the 
context that it will affect the trading activity of many countries, it is however essentially a 
bilateral issue between two neighboring Arctic nations, the United States (Alaska) and 
Canada.16 “Commercially, the importance of the passage lays in the future possibilities 
for its use. Until the present, navigation of the NWP has been extremely limited, 
consisting mainly of research and Arctic area community re-supply vessels. However, 
technological advances and global warming could make the NWP a viable international 
commercial sea route by the end of this century. In particular the existence of vast 
amounts of oil and gas on Alaska’s North Slope and the Beaufort Sea will likely provide 
an impetus for international commercial usage of the NWP.”17  
 
International Strait – The United States’ Position on the NWP 
As the worlds largest trading nation the United States has generally and consistently 
espoused the principle of the freedom of the seas.18 Whereas Canada, who’s territorial 
lands the frozen waterway zig zags through, has consistently claimed that the NWP is 
                                                 
14 “The 900-mile east-west water route runs from Baffin Island to the Beaufort Sea through a field of 
thousands of icebergs, and thence into the Pacific through the Bering Strait, which separates Siberia from 
Alaska.” http://www.english.upenn.edu/projects/knarf/contexts/passage.html  
15 Gorman Bob, in Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 28-30 September 2004, Institute of the North, U.S. 
Arctic Research Commission, International Arctic Science Committee. 
16 American University, Canadian Sovereignty at the Northwest Passage, ICE Case Studies Number 185, 
May 2006. http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/northwest-passage.htm 
17 Perrin, R.A. Crashing Through The Ice: Legal Control Of The Northwest Passage: Who Shall Be 
‘Emperor Of The North’, in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Fall 1988.  
18 Dube, Rebecca As Ice Melts, Debate Over Northwest Passage Heats Up, in USA 
Today 4/4/2006. Quote: “The United States generally supports maximum freedom of the 
seas. U.S. officials worry about what sort of precedent the NWP will present to global hot 
spots, such as the Strait of Hormuz near Iran and the Straight of Malacca between 
Malaysia and Indonesia.” Note: The International Court of Justice’s decision in the 
Norwegian Fisheries Case establishing straight baselines along the outer shores of the 
Norwegian Fjords would refute this theory. FISHERIES CASE(United Kingdom v. Norway 
)International Court of Justice, Dec. 18, 1951, General List No. 5. 
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sovereign to Canada. Until recently the decades old dispute between the United States 
and Canada has been largely academic. But as global temperatures rise and polar ice caps 
melt, and oil and gas commodity prices rise, the energy import dependant United States 
and the Canadian Government have begun to more clearly envision the value and 
viability of the NWP as a control and access route to the abundant supply of under 
exploited natural resources of the Arctic. According to Robert Huebert, Associate 
Director of the Centre For Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, 
“the heart of the dispute is the transit of international shipping, and who gets to set the 
rules.” Canada considers the NWP as its internal waters and as its sovereign wishes to 
control and regulate emergent shipping traffic through this navigationally poor and 
environmentally risky zone located within its territorial lands.  
 
Mississippi River Waterway – A Comparative View: An Internal Waterway or 
International Passage of Transnational Origin, With Passage between Two Major 
Gulfs? 
As a useful comparative analysis of the U.S. position on the NWP,  an analogy can be 
drawn with the Mississippi River19 which originates in Canada and is arguably part of a 
integrated waterway connected with the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River 
international water way, that technical has the ability to provide a semi-navigable 
watercourse of passage from the Bay St. Lawrence and North Atlantic to the Gulf of 
Mexico – which could be developed for improved navigation.  
 
Jus Cogens which is a Latin term representing fundamental international legal principles 
suggests that ‘good neighborliness’ is paramount for harmonious international relations 
and the principle is the very root of the U.S. position that the NWP is an international 
strait. Presumably then without invoking double standards and hypocrisy among nearest 
neighbors, the same theory would suggest that if the United States is justified in exclusive 
control and access to the Mississippi River as an internal waterway for their exclusive use 
rather than for mutual benefit with its Canadian neighbor, who arguably through 
historical ownership and usage shares and literally harbors intrinsic parts of the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
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waterway, then in lay mans words ‘what is good for the goose should also be good for the 
gander’. As such if the United States considers that the great Mississippi River is internal 
waters, despite its international dimensions of origin and shipping potential between two 
distinct and distant Gulfs, then so too on similar grounds it can be reasonably argued that 
the NWP is a Canadian internal waterway despite exogenous notions of freedom of the 
seas under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. In essence, if as a good 
neighbor Canada, Mexico and other nations who would stand to benefit from shorter 
shipping routes to internal American markets (or other proximate markets) accept or 
acquiesce with the notion that the Mississippi River is an internal U.S. waterway, then on 
the same principal the United States should cooperate with Canada in recognizing the 
uniqueness of the NWP and its sovereignty within the baselines of the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago. 
  
Global Interests in the NWP Dispute 
Not entirely unlike the potential community of interest for Canada, Mexico and other 
nations’ freedom to use the Mississippi River system as discussed above, I see the NWP 
as a dispute where all countries involved (neighboring Arctic nations of Greenland, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia, Iceland and others) have significant economic and legal 
interests at stake. Furthermore, beyond trade development and efficiencies, and “besides 
the importance of hydrocarbon reserves in the Canadian Arctic (especially in the context 
of increasing political instability in the Middle East), the central proximity of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago to the (former) Soviet Union and the United States makes 
this an area of vital security and defense interests. Indeed the shortest distance between 
the two super powers is across the Arctic Circle.”20  
 
While the European Union, led by the influence of the United Kingdom, in recognizing 
its economic interest has supported21 the United States position that the NWP is an 
                                                 
20 Kettunen, P.A. The Status of the Northwest Passage Under International Law, Detroit College of Law 
Review, Winter, 1990. 
21 Huebert, Rob Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage 
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international strait22 (although the support is qualified in the context of environmental 
concerns), Russia (Former Soviet Union - FSU) has in contrast expressed its support for 
Canada’s claim of complete control over the passage.23 The FSU’s position may have 
seemed surprising at the time in view of their strategic interest during the cold war in 
using the NWP for nuclear submarine defense, security and potential warfare. However, 
of a kindred sovereign character the NEP similarly links the Atlantic and Pacific, and is 
located in the Russian Arctic. The FSU have “claimed this passage through the Arctic by 
enacting legislation establishing ‘straight baseline’ boundaries around the waters, and 
classifying them as internal waters subject to complete Russian (FSU) control. Thus the 
Soviet Union has an interest in establishing complete legal sovereignty over the NEP 
through the Arctic waters which is almost identical24 to Canada’s interest in establishing 
sovereignty over the NWP through the Arctic.”25 This position by Russia seems broadly 
accepted as international commercial shipping through the NEP has been compliant with 
Russian statutory regulations and guidelines, which include both fees and supervision 
through the route. 
 
The United States as the sole remaining world super power has to approach this dispute 
delicately as it has in contemporary years garnered a reputation internationally for taking 
what is in its’ best interest e.g. oil fields in Iraq and the Middle East. According to Bob 
Huebert, the best solution to the dispute would be to “negotiate a joint management 
scheme for the Beaufort Sea without saying necessarily that one side was right and the 
other wrong.”26 
 
                                                 
22 Presumably every nation that wants to potentially use the NWP for international shipping and 
prospective resource access and/or exploration will skew their expressed interpretation and application of 
international law to promote their own national and/or regional domestic needs and economic growth. 
23 Perrin, R.A. Crashing Through The Ice: Legal Control Of The Northwest Passage: Who Shall Be 
‘Emperor Of The North’, in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Fall 1988. 
24 The NEP is comprises of only a few straits and a small number of scattered islands over an otherwise 
open northern Russian Arctic coastline and sea, versus the extensive ice laden island waterway archipelago 
network of the Canadian Arctic. 
25 Perrin, R.A. Crashing Through The Ice: Legal Control Of The Northwest Passage: Who Shall Be 
‘Emperor Of The North’, in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Fall 1988. 
26 Washington Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050612-123835-3711r_page2.htm 
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Due to the high need for North American security measures in the wake of 9/11 and the 
Bush led war on terror across the world, it is obviously beneficial socio-politically, 
environmentally and fiscally efficient for Canada to patrol and supervises the NWP. 
Effectively this also would ensure that the ecologically fragile arctic waterway will not be 
open to all and any global users. Whereas the United States can without an inherent right 
of innocent passage or freedom of seas transit, confidently rely on the 1988 Arctic 
Agreement signed by both nations and the North American Free Trade Agreement to 
ensure its continued use and access of the NWP route through Canadian territory. 
 
Exhibit 5 
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Furthermore under Part X of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),27 in recommending U.S. acquiescence that NWP is Canadian internal waters 
the United States would exclusively qualify as a neighboring land-locked state with a 
right of “traffic in transit” as a transit state under UNCLOS Article 124 (1) (b) e.g. 
“having a sea coast, situated between a land-locked State and the sea, through whose 
territory traffic in transit passes” whereby Alaska is effectively land-locked from 
convenient and effective land based access to the continental U.S. and stands to benefit 
from transit passes through the Canadian Arctic coastline. 
 
Practically, the legal consequences of water course classification differ significantly 
according to whether the NWP is deemed an international strait as the United States 
claims, a territorial seas strait, or internal waters as Canada claims. “If it is considered an 
international seas strait, then the more liberal right of ‘transit passage’ would exist for 
foreign vessels transiting through the waters of the Passage, as envisage by the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, even if the transit passage regime 
lacked prerequisites to enable it to be considered binding under international law, the 
legal regime of non-suspensive innocent passage would exist, as enunciated in the 1958 
Geneva Convention. However, if the NWP is considered to be merely a territorial seas 
strait, which is not used for international navigation, then the narrower right of 
suspensive-innocent passage would apply to foreign vessels transiting through its waters, 
as enunciated in both the 1958 and the 1982 conventions (significantly, this right does not 
allow a foreign vessel to travel in a submerged state), although the later convention 
appears to limit the situations where a littoral state may suspend such innocent 
passage.”28 
 
Ultimately, the distinction between an international strait, territorial seas and internal 
waters is an important one, as the classification triggers the interpretation of the 
applicable laws of the sea as set out in UNCLOS. “Internal waters are viewed as part of a 
                                                 
27 ‘Right of Access of Land-Locked States To and From The Sea and Freedom of Transit’ 
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state’s land domain and are thus subject to the complete sovereignty of the coastal state. 
In the territorial waters of a coastal state (waters seaward of the baseline), foreign states 
have the right of innocent passage. Under both multilateral maritime conventions, when 
waters not previously considered to be internal are subsequently enclosed by baselines, 
the same right of innocent passage exists for foreign states. If the waters are classified as 
an international strait, a coastal state’s powers are restricted to an even greater degree. 
The right of passage through an international strait is not suspendable by the coastal state. 
The rights of passage through international straits also include the right of overflight by 
aircraft, and the right of submarines to traverse in a sub merged mode.”29 
 
In arguing the NWP is an international strait the U.S. has relied primarily on the criteria 
established in the Corfu Channel case. The test applied for determining if a body of water 
is considered in law an international strait consists of two elements: (a) a geographic test 
and (b) a functional (or ‘use’) test.30 In the first instance the NWP clearly meets the 
geographic test; it is indeed a body of water joining two oceans or two areas of high 
seas31. Similarly applying this definition literally to the Mississippi River it could also 
arguably be identified as a body or course of navigable water that joins two areas of high 
seas (as a conduit watercourse of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence river system emanating at 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence in the North Atlantic, with a nexus to the Gulf of Mexico). 
Regardless of the potential for international transit between the Gulf of St. Lawrence and 
Gulf of Mexico, the United States understandably prefers to recognize the Mississippi as 
internal waters for its sovereign control and security purposes. And whereas the 
navigability of Mississippi River in its full length from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of 
Mexico is impractically questionable, it as such fails the functionality test. Likewise the 
NWP does not meet the functionality test due to adverse navigability and as the shipping 
traffic historically has been minimal (and almost exclusively Canadian or with Canadian 
permission and supervision), with no one established route among uncertain branch 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Kettunen, P.A. The Status of the Northwest Passage Under International Law, Detroit College of Law 
Review, Winter, 1990. 
29 Perrin, R. A. Crashing Through The Ice: Legal Control Of The Northwest Passage: Who Shall Be 
‘Emperor Of The North’, in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Fall 1988. 
30 McRae, Donald M. Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? 
31 Law of the Sea Convention, 1982. Articles 37 and 45. 
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routes being clearly established and the traffic being subject to seasonality and advanced 
ice breaking technology.32 Refer to Exhibits 12 and 13. As such from a functional 
perspective the NWP does not have an established international usage nor does its natural 
geography of a diverse network of shallow and ice laden passages and adverse weather 
lend to ready navigability, and on that basis it is not an international strait, because there 
is no established viable use as an international strait. 
 
Clearly, whether we are hypothetically speaking of the Mississippi River or of the NWP 
and their navigational potential to serve as international waterways, the fact that a body 
of water could potentially be used for navigation does not necessarily constitute it an 
international waterway.33 
 
The voyage of the Polar Sea is the only known transit of the NWP undertaken without 
consent of the Canadian government, and the U.S. government made it clear to the 
Canadian Government that in taking the expeditious short cut through the NWP that it did 
not regard the voyage as establishing a precedent that would challenge the Canadian 
claim of sovereignty over the NWP waters.34 In response, the Canadian government 
formally sanctioned the Polar Sea’s voyage.  Moreover, the subsequent 1988 Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement signed between the United States and Canada “suggests there 
will be no more Polar Sea voyages – that is, no more American navy icebreakers 
transiting the NWP without Canadian consent. So, even if the Polar Sea was a precedent, 
it is no more than an isolated, single instance. Thus, the conclusion remains: The NWP is 
not a strait that is ‘used for international navigation’ and hence cannot constitute in law 
an international strait.”35 
 
Whereas Alaska is not a land locked state and has a coastline on the Pacific Ocean, 
Bering Sea and Beaufort Sea, there are however numerous non-coastal U.S. States that 
                                                 
32 Professor Pharand in 1984 pointed out that in an 80-year history there had been only 11 foreign transits 
of the NWP, all “with Canada’s consent or acquiescence, either expressed or implied.” Northwest Passage: 
Arctic Straits, 102(1984) in McRae, Donald M. Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? 
33 McRae, Donald M. Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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have only land-locked based access to their fellow State of Alaska. For instance, Vermont 
which is a long distance from both the Alaskan highway and pipeline will greatly benefit 
from an Atlantic seaboard access via its neighboring New England states, to the North 
Atlantic and the NWP for expedient commercial shipment of trade goods between Alaska 
and the New England region. Similarly New York and the South Eastern U.S. seaboard 
would also greatly benefit from efficient access to the prospective energy and mineral 
resources that are present and prospective in Alaska, the Beaufort Sea and the broader 
Arctic region in general.  
 
Generally, it would be in the best interest of the U.S. for the sake of good relations with 
Canada, Canadian sovereignty, North American sovereignty, security, environmental and 
trade purposes to establish a co-operative strategic Arctic framework which would 
effectively provide the U.S. with exclusive transit  access for shipping and a right of 
innocent passage, but would exclude other nations doing so without express permission, 
because they would be unable to qualify as either a riparian or affected land-locked state 
status.  Furthermore under UNCLOS Part VIII & IX “the terms and modalities for 
exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-locked State/s and transit 
State/s concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements. And transit 
States, in the exercise of their sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take 
all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for 
land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests. ”36 This essentially 
means that the U.S. and Canada are obliged to arrive at a bilateral agreement providing a 
right of transit to the U.S. through the NWP and; which by its nature and application does 
not infringe on Canada’ sovereign interests in the NWP.  
    
The Canadian Position on the NWP – Internal Canadian Waters 
The position of the Canadian Government with respect to the NWP is oxymoronically 
both firm and soft. In the first instance Canada has consistently claimed sovereignty over 
the NWP and in contemporary years has taken to strategically referring to the waters as 
                                                 
36 Guruswamy, et al., Supplement of Basic Documents to International Environmental Law and World 
Order (2nd ed., West paperback 1999) p.776-778. 
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Canadian internal waters, and in 1986 after having signed the 1982 UNCLOS in a 
reaction to challenges by the US to its sovereignty over the NWP declared straight 
baselines premised on the outer shores of its arctic archipelago, to which the U.S. 
protested.37 
 
In contrast while Canada has at least been firmly consistent in defense of their claim to 
sovereignty of the NWP it has in fact by its own conciliatory nature arguably eroded the 
Canadian projection of sovereignty which it has diligently and purposively endeavored to 
cultivate in the international community by declaring that while Canada considers the 
waters of the NWP internal they at the same time support international shipping through 
the passage provided Canadian regulations are followed.38 Albeit gracious diplomacy, the 
implicit legal intent is an offer to accommodate the U.S. right of transit through the NWP 
on Canada’s terms with the belief that the U.S. really does not want an international 
channel, which would be an additional threat to their security and would erode their 
comparative shipping advantage in the area. 
 
“Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago39 stands or falls 
on whether the drawing of straight baselines enclosing the waters as internal waters can 
be justified in law and on whether the waters of the NWP constitute an international 
strait. The argument supporting the use of “straight baselines” in the context of the Arctic 
Archipelago derives from the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
1951 Fisheries Case.40 Professor Donald Pharand maintains that “the preponderant view 
of legal authorities is that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are properly 
enclosed by straight baselines and are the internal waters of Canada. ‘The Canadian 
                                                 
37 The weakness of the Canadian argument lies in the timing of its declaration. “Canada implemented 
straight baselines around the Arctic on January 1, 1986. However, in 1982, it had signed UNCLOS, in 
which article 8(2) states that a State cannot close an international strait by declaring straight baselines. 
Although the likely Canadian counter argument to this is that the NWP fails the Corfu Channel test for 
functionality as their has been no established historical use of the passage as an international strait prior to 
establishing the baselines. Furthermore, reference can be made to the Norwegian Fisheries case where 
similar baselines declared by Norway around their coastal archipelago was recognized by the ICJ. 
38 Huebert, Rob Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage 
39 The Archipelago concept in international law was established under part IV (Articles 46-54) of UNCLOS 
1982.  
40 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116  
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Arctic is nothing more the Norwegian skjaergaard writ large.’” Professor Donald McRae 
also points out that the geographic nexus between the Canadian mainland and its arctic 
archipelago and among the archipelago islands themselves, coupled with the use of the 
frozen waters by Canadian Inuit for land premised passage and their dependence on the 
whole of the archipelago (interrelationship between the land, ice and water of the area for 
indigenous people)41, and the uncertainty of “the highly irregular and indented nature of 
the coastline and islands lead to a classic case for departure from the low-water line 
rule.”42 
 
In the 1951 Fisheries Case the issue before the ICJ was the west coast of Norway, where 
the coastline similar to the Canadian Arctic coastline, is cut into by fjords and a series of 
many small coastal islands (known as “skjaergaard”). In the ICJ’s decision, instead of 
following the rule of low-water line which would follow the mainland coastline, straight 
baselines were allowed to be drawn seaward from the mainland to the island coasts and 
from island coast to island coast, effecting a linkage of baselines drawn along the outer 
shores of the coastal islands linked on each end to the mainland and enclosing within 
significant areas of water between the islands and between the islands and mainland. 
Effectively by the ICJ allowing these baselines to be drawn along the outer shores of the 
skjaergaard, it provided in law that the waters behind them would be ‘internal waters’.43 
Refer to Exhibit 6 below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 As the result of a 1951 decision by the International Court of Justice, straight baselines became a legally 
accepted means for determining the extent of coastal state control along fragmented coastlines, or "coastal 
archipelagos". Canada has also invoked its prior argument of historic internal waters in support of it’s  
straight baselines claim, arguing that its title to the waters within the baselines-which by definition are 
internal waters-was consolidated by historic usage. “The historic usage argument was reinforced in 1993 by 
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, whereby the Canadian government and Inuit affirmed that "Canada's 
sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy. 
42 McRae, Donald Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? 
43 Ibid. 
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Exhibit 6 
 
 
As noted in footnote 35 a paradox results when straight baselines are applied enclosing 
waters as inland waters where an existing strait used for international navigation exists. 
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“In such straits, vessels have a right of passage equivalent to the right of innocent passage 
in the territorial sea or, where the regime of “transit passage” applies, a right even greater 
than that of innocent passage. Although the extent of use necessary to constitute a strait 
as “international” is a matter of controversy, there must be some evidence that foreign 
shipping does in fact use the route for navigation” 44  
 
Inherently Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the waters of the NWP is supported by the 
fact there is no established history of international shipping through the NWP and as a 
result it fails the functionality test of an ‘international strait’ which by default infers that 
Canada’s application of straight baselines in 1986 will adhere to international legal 
scrutiny as there is no grounds to recognize a pre-existing international shipping use of 
the waterway. 
 
Further, in support of Canada’s straight baseline application to the outer shores of its 
arctic archipelago in addition to citing the Norwegian Fisheries case it is useful to note 
that there are an abundance of other nations who have similarly applied straight baselines 
out from their mainland coastline and along their coastal islands, effectively enclosing 
adjoining seas behind the baselines. For instance in Exhibit 7 below note the extension of 
straight baselines by the United Kingdom to outer coastlines of the Outer and Inner 
Hebrides of the Western Isles45 which effectively enclosed the Hebridean Sea and the Sea 
of Minch within national boundaries, albeit a navigational short cut historically used by 
many maritime nations for circumnavigating the British Isles.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 a series of Celtic Islands once ironically part of Great Britain’s ‘Clearances’. 
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Exhibit 7 
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Two other legal premises for Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the waters of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago are historic title and the ‘sector theory’.46 Basically Canada 
has not aggressively asserted its historic title argument implicit in its sovereignty claim to 
the NWP as the United States does not seem to have issues with Canada’s land based 
claims to the Arctic Archipelago. However U.S. dissention arises from Canada’s claim to 
sovereignty of the associated waterway. Furthermore, I suspect that historical claims47 
often prove difficult to argue when it comes to proving that other states have recognized 
or acquiesced in any claim to historic title by Canada to all the waters of its Arctic 
Archipelago. Although the time immemorial presence of the Inuit people, indigenous to 
Canada, on these lands and ice fields is a strong inherent supporting historical element to 
Canada’s (or its Inuit peoples’) claim to the waters of the NWP. 
 
An earlier tenet which Canada has also employed in its claim of sovereignty over its 
adjoining arctic and polar region is the sector theory. “According to the sector theory, 
polar states are entitled to exercise sovereignty between their mainland territory and the 
North Pole in an area bounded by the lines of longitude running from their east and west 
coasts to the Pole. This theory is associated with the famous resolution asserting 
Canadian sovereignty up to the North Pole introduced into the Canadian Senate in 1907 
by Senator Poirier.”48 See Exhibit 8 below. 
 
Canada may also founds its claim for sovereignty on the principle of acquired title 
(cession from a sovereign),  equity with respect to Canada’s distinct interest in using the 
                                                 
46 McRae, Donald Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? 
47 The historic consolidation argument is also supported by judgments of international 
courts. In 1975, in a dispute between Spain and Morocco over the Western Sahara, the 
International Court of Justice held that the historic presence of nomadic peoples can help 
to establish sovereignty. And in 1933, in a dispute between Norway and Denmark over 
Eastern Greenland, the predecessor to the International Court of Justice, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, held that the degree of presence necessary to establish title 
over territory is lower in inhospitable regions than in more temperate climes.” (Excerpted 
from Independence and Internationalism, chapter 10, "A Northern Dimension for 
Canada's Foreign Policy", pp. 127-135.) 
48 Ibid. 
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NWP for national security & protection  of the environment and Inuit people & culture, 
and finally as in the Norwegian and Iceland Fisheries49 cases Canada may assert that the 
archipelago waters are vital for traditional Inuit community for hunting and fishing to 
sustain their needs the Inuit and Northern peoples of Canada.50 
 
    Exhibit 8 
 
 
“The fact of the existence of the coastal state is the backbone of all legal regimes in the 
law of the sea where the state exercises some degree of legal power based on its 
territory”51  This notion provides the basis “for delineation of different legal regimes for 
                                                 
49 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland), I.C.J., 1974. “found that the Icelandic Regulations of 1972 
constituting a unilateral extension of the exclusive fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautical miles from the 
baselines are not opposable to the United Kingdom.” 
50 Perrin, R.A. Crashing Through the Ice: LegalControl of the Northwest Passage, Tulane Maritime Law 
Journal, Fall 1988. 
51 Guruswamy, et al., International Environmental Law and World Order: A Problem-Oriented Cousebook 
(2nd ed., West hardback 1999) p. 415. 
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the marine and submarine areas, with their respective disparate statutes. While the coastal 
state possesses a certain degree of legal power over the marine and submarine areas 
situated relatively close to its coast (the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf), such legal power is not 
recognized by the law of the sea rules for marine and submarine areas situated relatively 
distant from its coast (the high seas, the seabed outside the limits of national 
jurisdiction).”52 
Exhibit 9 
 
 
Furthermore, under the ‘Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, as adopted by the American Law Institute, Section 603 (State Responsibility for 
Marine Pollution) and based on Articles 194, 207-12, 217 and 220 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea it is recognized that “A coastal state also has the right 
to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the 
limits of its exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and 
the presence of ice for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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navigation, and where pollution of the marine environment could cause harm to, or 
irreversible disturbances of the ecological balance. The coastal state is obliged to base 
such laws and regulations on the best scientific evidence and to have due regard to 
navigation. Article 234.”53 
 
As well Guruswamy provides under Article 220 (2) and also in reference to Articles 
19(2)(h), 21(1)(f) and 27 “Where there are clear grounds for believing that a foreign ship, 
while passing through the territorial sea of the coastal state, violated laws and regulations 
of that state adopted in accordance with applicable international rules and standards, the 
coastal state may, subject to certain procedural safeguards (see Article 226), undertake 
physical inspection of the vessel in the territorial sea in order to ascertain the facts 
relating to the violation. Where evidence so warrants, the coastal state may institute 
proceedings against the ship, in accordance with its laws, and may detain the ship 
pending such proceedings.”54 
 
Alicia Zorzetto in her American University, Ice Case Study Number 185, May 2006 
report on Canadian Sovereignty at the Northwest Passage provides in her conflict 
environment scan that “the conflict should not be considered a “yield” or “stalemate” 
because it is unique. This issue may be in the midst of being amicably resolved. 
Therefore, it is too early in this situation to determine an outcome.” For a synoptic 
overview of the dynamics of the US-Canada NWP dispute note per Exhibit 10 below that 
the problem identification in the NWP conflict is described as having its core origin 
rooted with ‘Warming in the Polar Region’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Guruswamy, et al., Supplement of Basic Documents to International Environmental Law and World 
Order (2nd ed., West paperback 1999) p.145. 
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Exhibit 10 
US/Canada NWP Conflict Environment 
 
Which interestingly enough shows that global warming and environmental changes can 
have extensive geo-political effects, such as changing water and ice dynamics placing 
new pressures on demands for new international shipping routes, sovereignty claims, 
environmental concerns and resource control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 Ibid. 
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Exhibit 11 
 
 
Three Polar bears approach the starboard bow of the USS Honolulu submarine while 
surfaced 280 miles from the North Pole. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The NWP is a strategic route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through a 
myriad of northern Canadian arctic archipelago islands. The NWP was not traditionally a 
commercially viable trading route due to shallow waters and, in particular, ice blockades. 
Global warming has now altered this reality! Because of climate change, the Canadian 
government is experiencing new challenges from multiple national governments, 
especially the United States, concerning the feasibility of international transit through the 
NWP.  
 
The Canadian perspective is that they have full sovereignty encompassing the 
islands/waterways and thereby will assert complete control over all activity in that 
specific region. However, many countries perceive the NWP to be an international 
waterway between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In response, the Canadian 
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government has continually stated that it does support international shipping through the 
NWP, as long as Canadian awareness and regulations, within the guidelines of 
international law, are followed.  
 
International law under the United Nations requires that disputing nations seek in the first 
instance to cooperatively resolve their differences and in fact the United Nations 
International Court of Justice has no general jurisdiction to hear applications from 
complainant states submitted unilaterally, with few exceptions. Furthermore, “states often 
do not want to risk losing a case when the stakes are high or be troubled with litigation in 
minor matters.”55  
 
Given the changing environment and the obvious elevating interest in the NWP a more 
vigorous search for resolution palatable for both the United States and Canada is 
required. Primary to the U.S. claim is the fundamental law of the sea espousing ‘freedom 
of the sea’ and the right of innocent passage through international waters, and territorial 
seas. Primary to the Canadian claim is its desire to prevent diminution of sovereignty 
over its arctic. In customary international law the U.S. claim is supported by the Corfu 
Channel case and the Canadian claim of internal waters founded on the use of straight 
baselines extended to the outside shores of its archipelago is founded on the I.C.J.’s 
decision in the Norwegian Fisheries Case and use straight baseline use by numerous other 
States with coastal archipelago’s such as the United Kingdom’s extension of baselines to 
the outer shores of the Outer Hebrides of its Western Isles off the Sea of Minch. 
 
The arguments in favor and contra for both the U.S. and Canadian positions are numerous 
and the law is inconclusive and although the author favors the Canadian legal argument, 
he recognizes that in the end even if Canada were to have the NWP recognized as its 
internal waterway there would still remain a very basic obligation of good neighborliness 
to allow passage on a non-discriminatory basis when and where navigation could be 
executed with due care and sensitivity for the region. Alternatively if a hard line were to 
be drawn it could be readily noted that the alternative NEP and Polar Route are 
                                                 
55 Ibid p. 202. 
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logistically viable routes and more favorable routes that can be used, and consistent with 
the concept of equity where the practice is one of what a reasonable prudent person 
would do, then exclusionary provisions are indeed acceptable where the situation merits 
and alternative options are comparatively more favorable. 
 
I believe that the most contentious issue that Canada has with the U.S. position is that 
although the U.S. has declared they recognize Canada’s ownership of the maze of islands 
through which the NWP flows, as a sovereign nation they feel violated when the US does 
not feel compelled to seek consent, or at least to give notice that they will be passing 
through Canadian territory.  It has been readily seen through out history that one person’s 
liberties can be another’s intrusions. As ‘self’ and ‘mutually’ respecting nations Canada 
and the United States must begin to earnestly work together toward building a strategic 
approach to resolving the NWP  dispute which synergistically may be broadened to 
include a framework for a joint plan dealing with not only passage to and through the 
NWP, but as well the ongoing management and protection  needs for the area. 
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Exhibit 12 
 
Marine Traffic in the Canadian Arctic 
June – November 2004 
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Exhibit 13 
 
Transits of the Northwest Passage 
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Transits of the Northwest Passage 
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Transits of the Northwest Passage 
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Transits of the Northwest Passage 
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Transits of the Northwest Passage 
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